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Abstract 
A new genre of intellectuals has newly arisen in Turkey. They are coming from Islamic backgrounds. They are 
different from both modernizing elites of State and traditional Ulema of Islam. The most distinctive feature of them 
is that they are self-confident towards western philosophy and intellectuals, while being pudent towards people. In 
this article both defining features of new Islamic Intellectuals by comparision and contrast to state intellectuals and 
ulema. 
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I. Introduction 
In the post 1980 era in all spheres 
of life Turkey has undergone so big 
changes and transformations that some 
intellectuals used the phrases like “silent 
revolution”(Yavuz, 2003:1-8), “emergence 
of a new Turkey” (Yavuz, 2007: 1-20) to 
signify particular consequences of that 
conjuncture. Of course not all decades are 
to witness to the same, unilinear and 
homogenous processes with respect to 
dynamics informing New Turkey. First 
decade is of particular importance with 
respect to the creation of new economic 
opportunity spaces by then economic 
restructuring programs for the emergence 
of a new businessmen group mostly 
organized under the umbrella of MÜSİAD.  
MÜSİAD, as a newly emerging and 
competent agent in export oriented 
economy of Motherland Party –then 
governing party- has become a major 
challenging force against the priviledged 
business man club of TUSİAD. The second 
decade has been a witness to many 
setbacks for the newly arising classes and 
the capital caused by the old governing 
elites mostly positioned in military and 
judiciary higher ranks of bureaucracy. The 
tensions between old and the new 
dynamics and classes of Turkey caused 
some setbacks, backpedaling, political 
crises so much so that culminating to a 
covert military coup d’etat in 1997 on 28 
February. The next decade however it is 
tension ridden is witness to revolutionary 
changes not just in economic sphere but in 
political, social arenas as well. Just like 
new business classes emerged in previous 
decades new genre of political and 
intellectual personas started to take the 
scene in Turkey. New capitalist group has 
pulled attention of academic studies but the 
Islamic intellectuals are not yet taken the 
necessary attention. Whereas they are 
utmost importance in the formation of 
intellectual capital behind Justice and 
Development Party (JDP).  
In this article I will write about the 
rise of a new class of Muslim intellectuals 
in Turkey in the past two decades. In order 
to better describe the characteristics of this 
new group of Muslim intellectuals and 
their difference from the previous 
generations of Muslim and Islamic 
intellectuals and from the secular and non-
Islamic intellectuals in Turkey, I will try to 
answer the questions of “Who are the new 
Muslim intellectuals?”, “What are their 
certain characteristics?”, “What makes the 
new Muslim intellectuals different from 
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previous Muslim intellectuals including the 
ulema and other leading non-islamic 
intellectuals in Turkey?” “How do they 
affect Islamic discourse?” and “What is 
their influence in Turkish society?” 
 There is an emerging generation 
of Muslim intellectuals in Turkey.  I think 
that studying this generation of 
intellectuals will not only be helpful for 
understanding the transformation of 
Islamic identity and discourse in 
contemporary Turkey but also will be 
instrumental for the understanding of the 
dynamics of Turkish society at large.  
II. State Intellectuals: 
Before starting to talk about the 
new generation Muslim intellectuals, I 
think that it is important to go back to the 
early years of Turkish republic and briefly 
look at the general characteristics of the 
intellectuals.   
The founding fathers of the Turkish 
republic were thinking that the reason why 
Ottoman Empire declined and why the 
Turkish society could not keep up with the 
developmental achievements of the West 
were because of the tradition and religion.  
For example, for Mustafa kemal 
“the teacher of the newly established 
nation,” “it was the religion which blocked 
the innate development potential of the 
Turks.” Similarly, the founding fathers of 
the republic had the idea that cutting all the 
ties from the past and from the religion 
will solve the problems and help develop 
the Turkish nation.  
In order to overcome these 
obstacles they instrumentalized secularism, 
positivism and nationalism, three major 
concepts of western model of modernism. 
Therefore, the main objective of the new 
republic was to modernize through 
westernization. In order to achieve this 
goal, the founding fathers primarily 
including Mustafa Kemal wanted to build a 
new society and a nation state which will 
be the guardian of these modern values. In 
this regard, the state implemented radical 
reforms in order to reshape all segments of 
the society according to western modern 
values and principles. For example, the 
state abolished the caliphate, religious 
schools and sufi lodges. In addition, the 
state replaced the old ottoman alphabet 
with the new Latin alphabet. I think that 
with these reforms the state and its 
founding fathers wanted to create a tabula 
rasa so that they can manipulate the minds 
and the lives of the citizens and thereby 
create a modern nation state (Nişancı, 
2001).          
Therefore, the state supported and 
educated new elites who embraced the 
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ideals of the secularist and modernist 
kemalist state, after the establishment of 
secularist Turkish republic in 1923. These 
state elites were the agents of the state 
ideology of a top-down transformation and 
reformation approach (İnsel: 1997: 21). 
Therefore, these elites had a Jacobin 
mentality. They were outside and above 
the society as they were supporting an idea 
“for people and against people” by 
presenting themselves as the emancipators 
of the people and the nation. They were 
different from the society with their way of 
life including their dressing styles.  
In this regard, their main goal was 
to marginalize the religion and the tradition 
and to exalt the secularist modern identity 
and way of life without criticizing the 
west. In order words, they were criticizing 
the tradition but praising the West. I think 
that they were looking at the society from 
an orientalist perspective. I also think that 
it would be appropriate to call these 
intellectuals as native orientalists.   
Moreover, they were not producing 
the knowledge for themselves but for a 
project which made these elites a higher 
status group in society. That is why; most 
of these elites were part of the state 
bureaucracy working as teachers and 
professors.  
I think that the early intellectuals of 
the Turkish republic were more of “organic 
intellectuals” in Gramscian terms. 
Because, they did not question and criticize 
the modernity. They just accepted and 
welcomed the modernization ideals of the 
new republic and worked as the social 
engineers of the modernization project of 
the kemalist state.   
The dominance of the regime’s 
intellectuals were paramount until the end 
of one party rule in 1950. Their influence 
diminishingly continued until the 1980’s, 
which represented declining power of 
nation states and the rise of neo-liberal 
policies.     
III. First Generation Muslim 
Intellectuals (Ulema): 
While the early republic was 
pushing for its reforms with the help of its 
intellectuals, there were also resisting and 
challenging groups including major 
Islamic movement leaders and religious 
scholars such as Mehmed Zahid Kodku, 
Said Nursi, Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan and 
Elmalili Hamdi Yazir. Most of these 
religious intellectuals were defending the 
religion against materialist philosophy and 
secularist ideology.   
These intellectuals were also 
affected by revivalist thinkers such as 
Cemalleddin Afgani and Muhammad 
Abduh. That is also why the first 
generation Islamic intellectuals represented 
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a revivalist movement. These intellectuals 
supported the ideas that Islam as a religion 
and as a way of life was not against science 
and development. They rather argued that 
the ills of society can be cured if the 
individuals and the institutions are lived 
and functioned according to the principles 
of “true Islam.” Since Islam was under the 
attack of modernist and positivist 
ideologies, some of these early 
intellectuals had an apologetic approach in 
defending the religion.  
While the modernist state 
intellectuals were supported by the 
republic, religious scholars and 
intellectuals were persecuted. For example, 
Iskilipli Akif was tried in exceptionally 
authorized “Istiklal Mahkemesi courts” 
and executed in 1926 since he rejected 
wearing the hat. Said Nursi was persecuted 
many times, jailed and exiled in different 
parts of the country.  
These early religious intellectuals 
were well accepted by the masses. For 
example, Said Nursi according to one of 
the court reports had over five hundred 
thousand followers in 1947. In addition, 
these older generation religious 
intellectuals primarily including Mehmed 
Zahit Kodku, Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan 
and Said Nursi  have been very influential 
in shaping the later generation Muslims’ 
religious and political discourses. All Nur 
movements are fallowing Said Nursi’s, 
Iskenderpasa Community is following 
Mehmed Zahid Kotku’s, and Sulaymanci 
communities are following the teachings of 
Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan.   
IV. Second generation Muslims 
(Islamist Intellectuals): 
After the first generation of Islamic 
scholars who were educated in Ottoman 
educational institutions, a new group of 
muslim intellectuals who were educated in 
the republic’s secularist educational system 
began to emerge after the 1970’s. These 
intellectuals including Ali Bulac, Rasim 
Ozden Oren, Ismet Ozel, Alparslan 
Acikgenc and Nazif Gurdogan became 
more visible after 1980’s. These 
intellectuals mainly appealed to the 
university students. 
Unlike the first generation Islamic 
intellectuals, these second generation 
Islamic intellectuals did not frequently 
refer to Quran and Hadith. Rather, they 
used a modern rhetoric and spoke about 
meta-narratives. One of their major aim 
was to prove that the sources of the 
problems in the Muslim world in general 
and in Turkey in particular was 
colonialization of Muslim muslims’ life 
and minds by the western ideas and values. 
Therefore, they argued that cutting all the 
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ties from the western influence will solve 
the problems. For example, Ali Bulac a 
leading second generation Islamic 
intellectual, argued in his first book 
“Modern Concepts and Orders” he 
published in 1987, that the concepts used 
by the secular groups in turkey were 
profane which were coming from a foreign 
culture and civilization. Therefore, the 
solution, for him, was to cleanse the minds 
of Muslims polluted by the Western ideas.   
These second generation elites 
were supporting both the Islamization of 
politics as well as the Islamization of the 
knowledge. In short, I argue that the 
second generation Islamic intellectuals 
were reimagining Islam in the opposite 
mirror of the West. Therefore, I think that 
they looked at Islam as more of a political 
ideology rather as a source of ontological 
and moral teachings.  
V. New generation of (Post- 
Islamist) Muslim 
Intellectuals:   
The second generation Islamist 
intellectuals and their anti-western 
discourses remained influential until the 
Post-modern coup d’état in 1997 which 
facilitated the rise of a post-Islamist 
movement. After the coup d’état, the 
military, the secular bureaucracy including 
the judiciary and the secularist media 
formed an alliance to expel and eliminate 
the Muslims from the public spaces 
especially from universities. For example, 
more than 40 academicians were laid off at 
Dumlupinar University because they were 
practicing Muslims and because they had 
connections with religious communities. In 
addition many Quran schools and religious 
non-profit organizations were banned 
during this time.  
1997 or February 28
th
 coup d’état 
represented a decisive process in 
determining the mindset of the new 
Muslim intellectuals. Since they have seen 
aggressive forms of state control and 
authority, they realized how state authority 
and unbalanced political power could turn 
into oppression and how uncontrolled 
power could lead to coercion. That is why 
they started supporting the idea of 
democratization of the political authority 
alongside the rule of law and to a certain 
extent they gave up the idea of controlling 
the political authority. Under this pressure, 
Muslim intellectuals started to change their 
discourse from Islamist rhetoric to a 
human rights and democracy oriented 
discourse.  
These new generation intellectuals 
do not write and speak about Religious 
issues.  Unlike the second generation 
Islamist intellectuals, these new Muslim 
intellectuals also do not glorify Islamic 
past unlike previous Islamists like Necip 
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Fazil and Sezai Karakoc. That is why I 
don’t call the third generation as Islamic 
intellectuals. I think that defining these 
intellectuals as Post-Islamist intellectuals 
would describe them better.   
Yasin Aktay, Ahmet Yildiz, 
Mucahit Bilici, Nihal Bengisu Karaca, 
Ahmet T. Kuru, Abdulhamit Bilici, Fikri 
Akyuz, Ekrem Dumanli, Hilal Kaplan, 
Bulent Kenes, Yalcin Akdogan, Mustafa 
Sentop, and Ishak Torun can be named 
among these new generation Muslim 
intellectuals.  
These intellectuals are mostly 
coming from middle and lower middle 
class family backgrounds. They are well-
educated and some of them are columnists, 
academicians and consultants.  They are 
characterized in general by critical 
tendency towards all kinds of status quo. 
As William Cittick noted, the new 
generation Muslim intellectuals were 
strongly influenced by their professions. 
That is why they became more 
individualist. They did not also ask the 
Question of what Quran is asking me to do. 
Rather they asked the Question of What I 
can find from the Quran. They did not talk 
about the obligations and duties of 
Muslims and themselves but talked about 
democratic rights and individual freedoms.  
These new intellectuals also form 
alliances with other liberalist intellectuals 
both inside and outside the country. I think 
that the Abant platform is a good example 
of such alliances. Gazeteciler ve yazarlar 
vakfi “Journalists and writers foundation” 
started to organizes meetings in Abant 
Turkey starting from 1998 one year after 
the 28 February coup d’état to discuss 
issues related to human rights and 
democracy.  Although the organizers of the 
platform are affiliated with Muslim 
communities, the participants of the 
platform are also coming from other 
opinion groups of the Turkish society 
primarily including the liberals. Moreover, 
some of these intellectuals such as Yildiray 
Ogur and Bekir Berat Ozipek are 
collaborating with the “Genc Siviller” 
“The Young Civilians” a popular anti-
authoritarian pro-democracy group which 
has been organizing demonstrations 
against elitism and military intervention in 
politics after 2000’s.  
Unlike the second generation 
Islamic intellectuals these new intellectuals 
are not using a discourse against post-
colonialism and western ideals with 
essentialist approaches. In addition, the 
new generation intellectuals are not 
challengers of modernism as noted by 
Ihsan Dagi. In this regard, most of these 
 The New Intellectual Capital of Turkey: Muslim Intellectuals 
Emerging Markets Journal | P a g e  |133 
Volume 3 No 2 (2013)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   10.5195/emaj.2013.44   |   http://emaj.pitt.edu 
Muslim intellectuals are supporting 
Turkey’s bid for EU membership unlike 
the second generation Islamic intellectuals. 
They are also supporting more inclusive 
policies, democratization of political 
processes and liberalization of the market 
economy.  
After the establishment of the 
Turkish republic, the old Ulema were 
accepted by society but not by the state. 
The intellectuals of the republic were well 
accepted by the state and its secular 
institutions but not much by the society at 
large. The New Muslim intellectuals seem 
to be in between. At the beginning, they 
were not accepted by the state and they 
were trying to carve a space for 
themselves. Similarly, they were not well 
accepted by the religious communities at 
the beginning either because they were 
criticizing both the state authority and the 
authority of the religious communities. 
When they started speaking against the 
oppression of the state and the secularist 
establishment, they began to be embraced 
by the religious communities.    
Unlike the second generation 
Islamic Intellectuals, the new generation of 
Muslim intellectuals looked at Europe as 
an ally in order to force the Turkish state 
for human rights reforms. The second 
generation of Islamic intellectuals would 
say that women should cover themselves 
and wear headscarf since it is mentioned in 
Quran. However, the new generation 
referred to the human rights to justify why 
women should wear the Hidjab. For 
example, they said that the women have 
the right to choose whether she is going to 
wear hidjab or not and that the state should 
respect those rights.       
Unlike the former religious elite or 
the ulema, they were educated in secular 
institutions and had a more secular 
discourse. However, they were not well- 
accepted by the state ideology because the 
secular discourse used by these elites was 
supporting ideas against the statuesque. 
The state elite on the other hand were both 
educated in secular institutions and 
supported by the state ideology because 
they lend their support to the state’s 
secularist and modernist ideology.  
The second generation intellectuals 
were largely influenced by post-colonial 
intellectuals in the Muslim world such as 
Ali-Sheriati, Sayyid Qutb and Sayyed Abul 
Ala Mawdudi. The first and second 
generation Muslims thought that 
emancipation would be realized by going 
towards the religion. The state elite were 
thinking that emancipation would come 
with going away from religion. The third 
generation Muslims supported the idea that 
emancipation would come through 
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democratization, freedom and 
liberalization.  
As agents, new intellectuals do not 
support the idea of Islamization of society. 
Rather, they support democratization of 
public space and the expansion of human 
rights. They are more interested in the 
salvation of self from all forms of 
oppression and they are not much 
interested in establishing moral codes for 
the society. That is was we can say that the 
new intellectuals were affected pretty 
much from liberalism. The new Muslim 
intellectuals are both professionals and 
intellectuals. Their professional sides are 
more visible than their ideological side. 
That is also why we can conclude that the 
new Muslim intellectuals represent an 
internal secularization of religion and 
vernacularization of modernity.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 I argue that Islamic political 
identity is a dynamic and the 
transformation in this identity does not 
only reflect the transformation of the 
Islamic and Muslim identity but also 
indicates the major transformation in 
Turkish politics.        
They are an outcome of 
transformation of a post-islamist paradigm. 
This transformation also contributed 
significantly to the democratization 
process of Turkey. Their transformation in 
their identity also transformed Islamic 
discourse and gave rise to a post-Islamist 
paradigm.   
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